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Abstract
The success of DNNs has driven the extensive appli-
cations of person re-identification (ReID) into a new era.
However, whether ReID inherits the vulnerability of DNNs
remains unexplored. To examine the robustness of ReID sys-
tems is rather important because the insecurity of ReID sys-
tems may cause severe losses, e.g., the criminals may use
the adversarial perturbations to cheat the CCTV systems.
In this work, we examine the insecurity of current best-
performing ReID models by proposing a learning-to-mis-
rank formulation to perturb the ranking of the system out-
put. As the cross-dataset transferability is crucial in the
ReID domain, we also perform a back-box attack by devel-
oping a novel multi-stage network architecture that pyra-
mids the features of different levels to extract general and
transferable features for the adversarial perturbations. Our
method can control the number of malicious pixels by using
differentiable multi-shot sampling. To guarantee the incon-
spicuousness of the attack, we also propose a new percep-
tion loss to achieve better visual quality.
Extensive experiments on four of the largest ReID
benchmarks (i.e., Market1501 [45], CUHK03 [18],
DukeMTMC [33], and MSMT17 [40]) not only show the
effectiveness of our method, but also provides directions of
the future improvement in the robustness of ReID systems.
For example, the accuracy of one of the best-performing
ReID systems drops sharply from 91.8% to 1.4% after being
attacked by our method. Some attack results are shown
in Fig. 1. The code is available at https://github.
com/whj363636/Adversarial-attack-on-
Person-ReID-With-Deep-Mis-Ranking.
1. Introduction
The success of deep neural networks (DNNs) has bene-
fited a wide range of computer vision tasks, such as person
∗Equal contribution
†Corresponding author
000
001
002
003
004
005
006
007
008
009
010
011
012
013
014
015
016
017
018
019
020
021
022
023
024
025
026
027
028
029
030
031
032
033
034
035
036
037
038
039
040
041
042
043
044
045
046
047
048
049
050
051
052
053
054
055
056
057
058
059
060
061
062
081
082
083
084
085
086
087
088
089
090
091
092
093
094
095
096
097
098
099
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
CVPR
#2062
CVPR
#2062
CVPR 2020 Submission #2062. CONFIDENTIAL REVIEW COPY. DO NOT DISTRIBUTE.
Transferable White- and Black-box Attacks on Person Re-identification
Anonymous CVPR submission
Abstract
The success of DNNs has driven the extensive
cations of person re-identificatio (R ID) into a
However, wheth r R ID inherits th vulnerability
r mains unexplor d. To examine the robustness of
tems is rather important becaus the insecurity of
tems may cause severe losses, e.g., the
the adversarial perturbations to cheat the CCTV
In this work, we examine the insecurity of
performing ReID models by proposing a transfer
and black-box attacker. We develop a novel
work architecture by pyramiding the features
levels to extract general and transferable features
adversarial perturbations. To attack ReID, we also propose
a dissimilarity loss function to perform a matching-based
attack rather than a classification-based one used before.
Our method can control the number of malicious pixels by
using differentiable multi-shot sampling. To guarantee the
inconspicuousness of the attack, we also propose a new per-
ception loss to achieve better visual quality.
Extensive experiments on four of the largest ReID bench-
marks (i.e., Market1501 [39], CUHK03 [14], DukeMTMC
[27] and MSMT17 [34]) ot nly show the effectiven ss of
our method, but also provides directions of the future im-
provement in the robustness of ReID systems. For example,
the accuracy of one f the best-perf rming ReID sy tems
drops sharply from 91.8% to 0.0% after being attacked by
our ethod. Some attack results are shown in Fig. 1.
1. Introduction
The success of deep neural networks (DNNs) has bene-
fited a wide range of computer vision tasks, such as person
re-identification (ReID), a crucial task aiming at matching
pedestrians across cameras. In particular, DNNs have ben-
efited ReID in learning discriminative features and adaptive
distance metrics for visual matching, which drives ReID to
a new era [30,38]. Thanks to DNNs, there have been exten-
sive applications of ReID in video surveillance or criminal
identification for public safety.
1. More Attacking Results
We compare the performance of the superhuman ReI-
D system (i.e. AlignedReID) before and after the attacks
in term of Rank-1!10 accuracies. Before being attacked,
the AlignedReID system has a 100% rank-10 accuracy (see
the 1st and 3rd row of Fig. 1 on Market1501). Howev-
er, after be ng attacked, all the top-10 predictions made by
AlignedReID with the highest confidence are incorrect (see
nd
omenon
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Figure 1. Visualization of the Rank-10 predictions of AlignedReI-
D before and after being attacked on Market1501 and CUHK03,
respectively. The green boxes represent the correctly matching im-
ages, while the red boxes represent the mismatching images. Only
top-10 predictions with highest confidence are visualized.
2. More Implementation Details
The experiments are performed on a workstation with an
NVIDIA Titan X GPUwith 12GB GPUmemory. The mini-
batch size is 32. The training takes 50 epochs. The filters in
each multi-column network in our multi-stage discriminator
are of size 4⇥ 4, which are initialized from a truncated nor-
mal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.02
(However, those who are followed by the spectral normal-
ization are excluded).
In Eqn. (7) of the paper, ↵ is fixed as 1.   is mainly set as
5 throughout the paper except for the section “the number
of pixels to be attacked” where   reduces from 5 to 0 when
we gradually cut down the number of attacked pixels.
3. Details of Multi-shot Sampling
First, recall some basic results about the order statis-
tics. Given a list of k real numbers, x1, . . . , xk can be
ged as ord(x1, . . . , xk) = (x1:k, . . . , xk:k), where
xk:k. Let X1, . . . , Xk be independent and
uted (iid) random variables (rvs) from an
distribution function F with a density
g of order statistics is
x1, . . . , xk) = (k + 1)
kY
i=1
f(xi) (1)
continuous with density f , then the den-
kth record from the sequence X1, . . . , Xk,
, can be calculated:
n+1
+ 1)
[ log(1 F (x))]n(1 F (x))k 1f(x)
(2)
(N) be the nth largest N th record from a se-
rvs X1, . . . , XN with a common dfF . The
) is (see in [1] for more proofs):
f
r
(N)
n
(y1, . . . , yN ) =
(N + 1)Nn
NY
j=1
f(yj)
(n+ 1)
[ log(1  F (y1))]n
(3)
Since the density of the Gumbel-Softmax distribution is:
f ,⌧ (x1, . . . , xk) = (k)⌧
k 1
kY
i=1
i
x⌧+1i
/(
kX
i=1
i
x⌧i
)k (4)
So when the temperature ⌧ approaches +1, the paren-
t distribution of f
r
(k)
n
is Uniform(0, 1), then Eqn.3 will
be specified as:
f
r
(N)
n
(y1, . . . , yN ) =
Nn (N + 1)
(n+ 1)
[ log(1  y1)]n (5)
Then when the temperature ⌧ approaches 0, f
r
(k)
n
becomes
to the categorical distribution, Eqn.3 will be specified as:
f
r
(N)
n
(y1, . . . , yN ) = 0 (6)
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images, ile the red boxes represent the mismatching images.
Despite the impressive gain obtained from DNNs,
whether ReID inherits the vulnerability of DNNs remains
unexplored. Specifically, recent works found that DNNs are
vulnerable to adversarial attacks [19,29] (An adversarial at-
tack is to mislead a system with adversarial examples). In
the past two years, the adversarial attack has achieved re-
markable success in fooling DNN-based systems, e.g., im-
age classification. Can the recent DNN-based ReID systems
survive from an adversarial attack? The answer seems not
promising. Empirically, evidence has shown that a person
wearing bags, hats, or la ses can mislead ReID system
to output a wrong prediction. These examples may be re-
garded as natural adversarial examples.
To examine th robustness of ReID systems against ad-
versarial attacks is of significant importance. Because the
insecurity of ReID systems may cause severe losses. For
example, in criminal tracking, the criminal may disguise
themselves by placing adversarial perturbations (e.g., bags)
on the most appropriate position of the body to cheat the
video surveillance systems. By investigating the adversar-
ial examples f r the ReID systems, we can identify the vul-
ner bility of these systems and help improve the robustness.
For instance, we can identify which parts of a body are most
vulnerable to the adversarial attack and require future ReID
systems to pay attention to these parts. We can also improve
ReID systems by using adversarial training in the future. In
1
Figure 1. The rank-10 predictions of AlignedReID [36] (one of
the state-of-the-art ReID models) before and after our attack on
Market-1501. The green boxes represent the correctly matching
images, while the red b es re rese t t e is atching images.
re-identification (ReID), a crucial task aiming at matching
pedestrians across cameras. In particular, DNNs have ben-
efited ReID in learning discriminative eatures and adaptive
dista ce me rics fo visual matching, which drive ReID to
a new era [36,44]. Thanks to DNNs, there have been exten-
siv applications of ReID in video surveillance or criminal
identification for public safety.
espite the impressive gain obtained from DNNs,
wheth r ReID inh rits the vuln rability of DNNs re ains
unexplored. Specifically, recent works found that DNNs are
vulnerable to adversarial attacks [24,35] (An adversarial at-
tack is to mislead a system with adversarial examples). In
the past two years, the adversarial attack has achieved re-
markable success in fooling DNN-based systems, e.g., im-
age classification. Can the ecent DNN-based ReID systems
survive from an adversarial attack? The answer seems not
promising. Empirically, evidence has shown that a person
wearing bags, hats, or glasses can mislead a ReID system to
output a wrong prediction [7,11,17,23,43]. These examples
m y be regarded as natural adversarial examples.
To examine th robustness of ReID systems against ad-
versarial attacks is of significant importance. Because the
insecurity of ReID systems may cause severe losses, for
example, in criminal tracking, the criminal may disguise
themselves by placing adversarial perturbations (e.g., bags,
hats, and glasses) on the most appropriate position of the
1
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body to cheat the video surveillance systems. By investi-
gating the adversarial examples for the ReID systems, we
can identify the vulnerability of these systems and help im-
prove the robustness. For instance, we can identify which
parts of a body are most vulnerable to the adversarial at-
tack and require future ReID systems to pay attention to
these parts. We can also improve ReID systems by using
adversarial training in the future. In summary, developing
adversarial attackers to attack ReID is desirable, although
no work has been done before.
As the real-world person identities are endless, and the
queried person usually does not belong to any category in
the database, ReID is defined as a ranking problem rather
than a classification problem. But existing attack meth-
ods for image classification, segmentation, detection, and
face recognition do not fit a ranking problem. Moreover,
since the image domains vary at different times and in dif-
ferent cameras, examining the robustness of ReID models
by employing a cross-dataset black-box attack should also
be taken into consideration. However, existing adversarial
attack methods often have poor transferability, i.e., they are
often designed for a sole domain of task (e.g., Dataset A)
and can not be reused to another domain (e.g., Dataset B)
due to their incapacity to find general representations for
attacking. Furthermore, we focus on attacks that are in-
conspicuous to examine the insecurity of ReID models. Ex-
isting adversarial attack methods usually have a defective
visual quality that can be perceived by humans.
To address the aforementioned issues, we design a trans-
ferable, controllable, and inconspicuous attacker to exam-
ine the insecurity of current best-performing ReID systems.
We propose a learning-to-mis-rank formulation to perturb
the ranking prediction of ReID models. A new mis-ranking
loss function is designed to attack the ranking of the poten-
tial matches, which fits the ReID problem perfectly. Our
mis-ranking based attacker is complementary to existing
misclassification based attackers. Besides, as is suggested
by [12], adversarial examples are features rather than bugs.
Hence, to enhance the transferability of the attacker, one
needs to improve the representation learning ability of the
attacker to extract the general features for the adversarial
perturbations. To this end, we develop a novel multi-stage
network architecture for representation learning by pyra-
miding the features of different levels of the discriminator.
This architecture shows impressive transferability in black-
box attack for the complicated ReID tasks. The transfer-
ability leads to our joint solution of both white- and black-
box attack. To make our attack inconspicuous, we improve
the existing adversarial attackers in two aspects. First, the
number of target pixels to be attacked is controllable in our
method, due to the use of a differentiable multi-shot sam-
pling. Generally, the adversarial attack can be considered
as searching for a set of target pixels to be contaminated
by noise. To make the search space continuous, we relax
the choice of a pixel as a Gumbel softmax over all possi-
ble pixels. The number of target pixels is determined by
the dynamic threshold of the softmax output and thus can
be controllable. Second, a new perception loss is designed
by us to improve the visual quality of the attacked images,
which guarantees the inconspicuousness.
Experiments were performed on four of the largest
ReID benchmarks, i.e., Market1501 [45], CUHK03 [18],
DukeMTMC [33], and MSMT17 [40]. The results show
the effectiveness of our method. For example, the perfor-
mance of one of the best-performing systems [44] drops
sharply from 91.8% to 1.4% after attacked by our method.
Except for showing a higher success attack rate, our method
also provides interpretable attack analysis, which provides
direction for improving the robustness and security of the
ReID system. Some attack results are shown in Fig. 1. To
summarize, our contribution is four-fold:
• To attack ReID, we propose a learning-to-mis-rank for-
mulation to perturb the ranking of the system output. A
new mis-ranking loss function is designed to attack the
ranking of the predictions, which fits the ReID prob-
lem perfectly. Our mis-ranking based adversarial at-
tacker is complementary to the existing misclassifica-
tion based attackers.
• To enhance the transferability of our attacker and per-
form a black-box attack, we improve the represen-
tation capacity of the attacker to extract general and
transferable features for the adversarial perturbations.
• To guarantee the inconspicuousness of the attack, we
propose a differentiable multi-shot sampling to control
the number of malicious pixels and a new perception
loss to achieve better visual quality.
• By using the above techniques, we examine the inse-
curity of existing ReID systems against adversarial at-
tacks. Experimental validations on four of the largest
ReID benchmarks show not only the successful attack
and the visual quality but also the interpretability of
our attack, which provides directions for the future im-
provement in the robustness of ReID systems.
2. Related Work
Person Re-identification. ReID is different from image
classification tasks in the setup of training and testing data.
In an image classification task, the training and test set
share the same categories, while in ReID, there is no cat-
egory overlap between them. Therefore, deep ranking [3] is
usually in desire for ReID. However, deep ranking is sen-
sitive to alignment. To address the (dis)alignment prob-
lem, several methods have been proposed by using struc-
tural messages [19, 36]. Recently, Zhang et al. [44] intro-
duce the shortest path loss to supervise local parts align-
+×
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Figure 2. (a) The framework of our method. Our goal is to generate some noise P to disturb the input images I. The disturbed images Iˆ
is able to cheat the ReID system T by attacking the visual similarities. (b) Specifically, the distance of each pair of samples from different
categories (e.g., (Iˆkc , I), ∀I ∈ {Icd}) is minimized, while the distance of each pair of the samples from the same category (e.g., (Iˆkc , I),
∀I ∈ {Ics}) is maximized. The overall framework is trained by a generative adversarial network (GAN ).
ing and adopt a mutual learning approach in the metric
learning setting, which has obtained the surpassing human-
level performance. Besides the supervised learning men-
tioned above, recent advance GANs have been introduced
to ReID to boost performance in some unsupervised man-
ner [2, 47, 49, 50]. Despite their success, the security and
robustness of the existing ReID system have not yet been
examined. Analyzing the robustness of a ReID system to
resist attacks should be raised on the agenda.
Adversarial Attacks. Since the discovery of adversarial
examples for DNNs [38], several adversarial attacks have
been proposed in recent years. Goodfellow et al. [6] pro-
poses to generate adversarial examples by using a single
step based on the sign of the gradient for each pixel, which
often leads to sub-optimal results and the lack of generaliza-
tion capacity. Although DeepFool [29] is capable of fooling
deep classifiers, it also lacks generalization capacity. Both
methods fail to control the number of pixels to be attacked.
To address this problem, [31] utilize the Jacobian matrix to
implicitly conduct a fixed length of noise through the direc-
tion of each axis. Unfortunately, it cannot arbitrarily decide
the number of target pixels to be attacked. [35] proposes
to modify the single-pixel adversarial attack. However, the
searching space and time grow dramatically with the incre-
ment of target pixels to be attacked. Besides the image clas-
sification, the adversarial attack is also introduced to face
recognition [4,34]. As discussed Section 1, all of the above
methods do not fit the deep ranking problem. Also, their
transferability is poor. Furthermore, many of them do not
focus on the inconspicuousness of the visual quality. These
drawbacks limit their applications in open-set tasks, e.g.,
ReID, which is our focus in this work. Although [51] has
studied in metric analysis in person ReID, it does not pro-
vide a new adversarial attack method for ReID. It just uses
the off-the-shelf methods for misclassification to examine
very few ReID methods.
3. Methodology
3.1. Overall Framework
The overall framework of our method is presented in Fig.
2 (a). Our goal is to use the generator G to produce decep-
tive noises P for each input image I. By adding the noises
P to the image I, we obtain the adversarial example Iˆ, us-
ing which we are able to cheat the ReID system T to output
the wrong results. Specifically, the ReID system T may
consider the matched pair of images dissimilar, while con-
sidering the mismatched pair of images similar, as shown in
Fig.2 (b). The overall framework is trained by a generative
adversarial network (GAN ) with a generator G and a novel
discriminator D, which will be described in Section 3.3.
3.2. Learning-to-Mis-Rank Formulation For ReID
We propose a learning-to-mis-rank formulation to per-
turb the ranking of system output. A new mis-ranking loss
function is designed to attack the ranking of the predictions,
which fits the ReID problem perfectly. Our method tends to
minimize the distance of the mismatched pair and maximize
the distance of the matched pair simultaneously. We have:
Ladv etri =
K∑
k=1
Ck∑
c=1
[
max
j 6=k
j=1...K
cd=1...Cj
∥∥T (Iˆkc )− T (Iˆjcd)∥∥22
− min
cs=1...Ck
∥∥T (Iˆkc )− T (Iˆkcs)∥∥22 + ∆]+,
(1)
where Ck is the number of samples drawn from the k-th
person ID, Ikc is the c-th images of the k ID in a mini-batch,
cs and cd are the samples from the same ID and the differ-
ent IDs,
∥∥ · ∥∥2
2
is the square of L2 norm used as the distance
metric, and ∆ is a margin threshold. Eqn.1 attacks the deep
ranking in the form of triplet loss [3], where the distance
of the easiest distinguished pairs of inter-ID images are en-
couraged to small, while the distance of the easiest distin-
guished pairs of intra-ID images are encouraged to large.
Remarkably, using the mis-ranking loss has a couple of
advantages. First, the mis-ranking loss fits the ReID prob-
lem perfectly. As is mentioned above, ReID is different
from image classification tasks in the setup of training and
testing data. In an image classification task, the training and
test set share the same categories, while in ReID, there is no
category overlap between them. Therefore, the mis-ranking
loss is suitable for attacking ReID. Second, the mis-ranking
loss not only fits the ReID problem; it may fit all the open-
set problems. Therefore, the use of mis-ranking loss may
also benefit the learning of general and transferable features
for the attackers. In summary, our mis-ranking based ad-
versarial attacker is perfectly complementary to the existing
misclassification based attackers.
3.3. Learning Transferable Features for Attacking
As is suggested by [12], adversarial examples are fea-
tures rather than bugs. Hence, to enhance the transferabil-
ity of an attacker, one needs to improve the representation
learning ability of the attacker to extract the general features
for the adversarial perturbations. In our case, the represen-
tation learners are the generator G and the discriminator D
(see Fig. 2 (a)). For the generator G, we use the ResNet50.
For the discriminator D, recent adversarial defenders have
utilized cross-layer information to identify adversarial ex-
amples [1, 20, 21, 27, 42]. As their rival, we develop a novel
multi-stage network architecture for representation learning
by pyramiding the features of different levels of the discrim-
inator. Specifically, as shown in Fig. 3, our discriminator
D consists of three fully convolutional sub-networks, each
of which includes five convolutional, three downsampling,
and several normalization layers [13, 28]. The three sub-
networks receives {1, 1/22, 1/42} areas of the original im-
ages as the input, respectively. Next, the feature maps from
these sub-networks with the same size are combined into the
same stage following [22]. A stage pyramid with series of
downsampled results with a ratio of {1/32, 1/16, 1/8, 1/4}
of the image is thus formulated. With the feature maps from
the previous stage, we upsample the spatial resolution by a
factor of 2 using bilinear upsampling and attach a 1 × 1
convolutional layer to reduce channel dimensions. After an
element-wise addition and a 3 × 3 convolutions, the fused
maps are fed into the next stage. Lastly, the network ends
with two atrous convolution layers and a 1 × 1 convolu-
tion to perform feature re-weighting, whose final response
map λ is then fed into downstream samplerM discussed in
Section 3.4. Remarkably, all these three sub-networks are
optimized by standard loss following [26].
3.4. Controlling the Number of the Attacked Pixels
To make our attack inconspicuous, we improve the ex-
isting attackers in two aspects. The first aspect is to control
the number of the target pixels to be attacked. Generally, an
+
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Figure 3. Detail of our multi-stage discriminator.
adversarial attack is to introduce a set of noise to a set of
target pixels for a given image to form an adversarial exam-
ple. Both the noise and the target pixels are unknown, which
will be searched by the attacker. Here, we present the for-
mulation of our attacker in searching for the target pixels.
To make the search space continuous, we relax the choice
of a pixel as a Gumbel softmax over all possible pixels:
pi,j =
exp((log(λi,j +Ni,j))/τ)∑H,W
i,j=1 exp(log(λi,j +Ni,j)/τ)
, (2)
where i ∈ (0, H), j ∈ (0,W ) denote the index of pixel
in a feature map of size H × W , where H/W are the
height/width of the input images. The probability pi,j of
a pixel to be chosen is parameterized by a softmax output
vector λi,j of dimension H ×W . Ni,j = −log(−log(U))
is random variable at position (i, j), which is sampled from
Gumbel distribution [8] with U ∼ Uniform(0, 1). Note
that τ is a temperature parameter to soften transition from
uniform distribution to categorical distribution when τ grad-
ually reduces to zero. Thus, the number of the target pixels
to be attacked is determined by the maskM :
Mij =
{
KeepT opk(pi,j), in forward propagation
pi,j , in backward propagation
(3)
where KeepT opk is a function by which the top-k pixels
with the highest probability pi,j are retained in M while
the other pixels are dropped during the forward propaga-
tion. Moreover, the difference between the forward and
backward propagation ensures the differentiability. By mul-
tiplying the maskM and the preliminary noise P ′, we ob-
tain the final noise P with controllable number of activated
pixels. The usage ofM is detailed in Fig. 2 (a).
3.5. Perception Loss for Visual Quality
In addition to controlling the number of the attacked pix-
els, we also focus on the visual quality to ensure the in-
conspicuousness of our attackers. Existing works introduce
noises to images to cheat the machines without considering
the visual quality of the images, which is inconsistent with
human cognition. Motivated by MS-SSIM [39] that is able
to provide a good approximation to perceive image quality
for visual perception, we include an perception loss LV P in
our formulation to improve the visual quality:
LV P (I, Iˆ) = [lL(I, Iˆ)]αL ·
L∏
j=1
[cj(I, Iˆ)]βj [sj(I, Iˆ)]γj , (4)
where cj and sj are the measures of the contrast compar-
ison and the structure comparison at the j-th scale respec-
tively, which are calculated by cj(I, Iˆ) = 2σIσIˆ+C2σ2I+σ2Iˆ+C2 and
sj(I, Iˆ) = σIIˆ+C3σIσIˆ+C3 , where σ is the variance/covariance.
L is the level of scales, αL, βj , and γj are the factors to
re-weight the contribution of each component. Thanks to
LV P , the attack with high magnitude is available without
being noticed by humans.
3.6. Objective Function
Besides the mis-ranking loss Ladv etri, the perception
loss LV P , we have two additional losses, i.e., a misclas-
sification loss Ladv xent, and a GAN loss LGAN .
Misclassification Loss. Existing works usually consider
the least likely class as the target to optimize the cross-
entropy between the output probabilities and its least likely
class. However, the model may misclassify the inputs as any
class except for the correct one. Inspired by [37], we pro-
pose a mechanism for relaxing the model for non-targeted
attack by:
Ladv xent = −
K∑
k=1
S(T (Iˆ))k((1−δ)1argminT (I)k+δvk), (5)
where S denotes the log-softmax function, K is the total
number of person IDs and v = [ 1
K−1 , . . . , 0, . . . ,
1
K−1 ] is
smoothing regularization in which vk equals to 1K−1 ev-
erywhere except when k is the ground-truth ID. The term
arg min in Eqn. 5 is similar to numpy.argmin which returns
the indices of the minimum values of an output probabil-
ity vector, indicating the least likely class. In practice, this
smoothing regularization improves the training stability and
the success attack rate.
GAN Loss. For our task, the generator G attempts to
produce deceptive noises from input images, while the dis-
criminator D distinguishes real images from adversarial ex-
amples as much as possible. Hence, the GAN loss LGAN is
given as:
LGAN = E(Icd,Ics)[logD1,2,3(Icd, Ics)]+EI [log(1−D1,2,3(I, Iˆ))],
(6)
where D1,2,3 is our multi-stage discriminator shown in Fig.
3. We access to the final loss function:
L = LGAN + Ladv xent + ζLadv etri + η(1− LV P ), (7)
where ζ and η are loss weights for balance.
4. Experiment
We first present the results of attacking state-of-the-art
ReID systems and then perform ablation studies on our
method. Then, the generalization ability and interpretability
of our method are examined by exploring black-box attacks.
Datasets. Our method is evaluated on four of the
largest ReID datasets: Market1501 [45], CUHK03 [18]
DukeMTMC [33] and MSMT17 [40]. Market1501 is a
fully studied dataset containing 1,501 identities and 32,688
bounding boxes. CUHK03 includes 1,467 identities and
28,192 bounding boxes. To be consistent with recent works,
we follow the new training/testing protocol to perform our
experiments [48]. DukeMTMC provides 16,522 bounding
boxes of 702 identities for training and 17,661 for test-
ing. MSMT17 covers 4,101 identities and 126,441 bound-
ing boxes taken by 15 cameras in both indoor and outdoor
scenes. We adopt the standard metric of mAP and rank-
{1, 5, 10, 20} accuracy for evaluation. Note that in contrast
to a ReID problem, lower rank accuracy and mAP indicate
better success attack rate in a attack problem.
Protocols. The details about training protocols and
hyper-parameters can be seen in Appendix C. The first two
subsections validate a white-box attack, i.e., the attacker has
full access to training data and target models. In the third
subsection, we explore a black-box attack to examine the
transferability and interpretability of our method, i.e., the
attacker has no access to the training data and target mod-
els. Following the standard protocols of the literature, all
experiments below are performed by L∞-bounded attacks
with ε = 16 without special instruction, where ε is an up-
per bound imposed on the amplitude of the generated noise
({‖Iˆ − I‖1,2,or∞ ≤ }) that determines the attack intensity
and the visual quality.
4.1. Attacking State-of-the-Art ReID Systems
To demonstrate the generality of our method, we divide the
state-of-the-art ReID systems into three groups as follows.
Attacking Different Backbones. We first examine the
effectiveness of our method in attacking different best-
performing network backbones, including ResNet-50 [9]
(i.e., IDE [46]), DenseNet-121 [10], and Inception-v3 [37]
(i.e., Mudeep [5]). The results are shown in Table 1 (a) &
(b). We can see that the rank-1 accuracy of all backbones
drop sharply approaching zero (e.g, from 89.9% to 1.2% for
DenseNet) after it has been attacked by our method, sug-
gesting that changing backbones cannot defend our attack.
Attacking Part-based ReID Systems. Many best-
performing ReID systems learn both local and global sim-
ilarity by considering part alignment. However, they still
fail to defend our attack (Table 1 (a)(b)). For example,
the accuracy of one of the best-performing ReID systems
(AlignedReID [44]) drops sharply from 91.8% to 1.4% af-
ter it has been attacked by our method. This comparison
Table 1. Attacking the state-of-the-art ReID systems. IDE: [46]; DenseNet-121: [10]; Mudeep: [5]; AlignedReid: [44]; PCB: [36]; HACNN:
[19]; LSRO: [47]; HHL: [49]; SPGAN: [2]; CamStyle+Era: [50]. We select GAP [32] and PGD [25] as the baseline attackers.
(a) Market1501
Methods
Rank-1 Rank-5 Rank-10 mAP
Before GAP PGD Ours Before GAP PGD Ours Before GAP PGD Ours Before GAP PGD Ours
Backbone
IDE (ResNet-50) 83.1 5.0 4.5 3.7 91.7 10.0 8.7 8.3 94.6 13.9 12.1 11.5 63.3 5.0 4.6 4.4
DenseNet-121 89.9 2.7 1.2 1.2 96.0 6.7 1.0 1.3 97.3 8.5 1.5 2.1 73.7 3.7 1.3 1.3
Mudeep (Inception-V3) 73.0 3.5 2.6 1.7 90.1 5.3 5.5 1.7 93.1 7.6 6.9 5.0 49.9 2.8 2.0 1.8
Part-Aligned
AlignedReid 91.8 10.1 10.2 1.4 97.0 18.7 15.8 3.7 98.1 23.2 19.1 5.4 79.1 9.7 8.9 2.3
PCB 88.6 6.8 6.1 5.0 95.5 14.0 12.7 10.7 97.3 19.2 15.8 14.3 70.7 5.6 4.8 4.3
HACNN 90.6 2.3 6.1 0.9 95.9 5.2 8.8 1.4 97.4 6.9 10.6 2.3 75.3 3.0 5.3 1.5
Data Augmentation
CamStyle+Era (IDE) 86.6 6.9 15.4 3.9 95.0 14.1 23.9 7.5 96.6 18.0 29.1 10.0 70.8 6.3 12.6 4.2
LSRO (DenseNet-121) 89.9 5.0 7.2 0.9 96.1 10.2 13.1 2.2 97.4 12.6 15.2 3.1 77.2 5.0 8.1 1.3
HHL (IDE) 82.3 5.0 5.7 3.6 92.6 9.8 9.8 7.3 95.4 13.5 12.2 9.7 64.3 5.4 5.5 4.1
SPGAN (IDE) 84.3 8.8 10.1 1.5 94.1 18.6 16.7 3.1 96.4 24.5 20.9 4.3 66.6 8.0 8.6 1.6
(b) CUHK03
Methods
Rank-1 Rank-5 Rank-10 mAP
Before GAP PGD Ours Before GAP PGD Ours Before GAP PGD Ours Before GAP PGD Ours
Backbone
IDE (ResNet-50) 24.9 0.9 0.8 0.4 43.3 2.0 1.2 0.7 51.8 2.9 2.1 1.5 24.5 1.3 0.8 0.9
DenseNet-121 48.4 2.4 0.1 0.0 50.1 4.4 0.1 0.2 70.1 5.9 0.3 0.6 84.0 1.6 0.2 0.3
Mudeep (Inception-V3) 32.1 1.1 0.4 0.1 53.3 3.7 1.0 0.5 64.1 5.6 1.5 0.8 30.1 2.0 0.8 0.3
Part-Aligned
AlignedReid 61.5 2.1 1.4 1.4 79.4 4.6 2.2 3.7 85.5 6.2 4.1 5.4 59.6 3.4 2.1 2.1
PCB 50.6 0.9 0.5 0.2 71.4 4.5 2.1 1.3 78.7 5.8 4.5 1.8 48.6 1.4 1.2 0.8
HACNN 48.0 0.9 0.4 0.1 69.0 2.4 0.9 0.3 78.1 3.4 1.3 0.4 47.6 1.8 0.8 0.4
(c) DukeMTMC
Methods
Rank-1 Rank-5 Rank-10 mAP
Before GAP PGD Ours Before GAP PGD Ours Before GAP PGD Ours Before GAP PGD Ours
Data augmentation
CamStyle+Era (IDE) 76.5 3.3 22.9 1.2 86.8 7.0 34.1 2.6 90.0 9.6 39.9 3.4 58.1 3.5 16.8 1.5
LSRO (DenseNet-121) 72.0 1.3 7.2 0.7 85.7 2.9 12.5 1.6 89.5 4.0 18.4 2.2 55.2 1.4 8.1 0.9
HHL (IDE) 71.4 1.8 9.5 1.0 83.5 3.4 15.6 2.0 87.7 4.2 19.0 2.5 51.8 1.9 7.4 1.3
SPGAN (IDE) 73.6 5.3 12.4 0.1 85.2 10.3 21.1 0.5 88.9 13.4 26.3 0.6 54.6 4.7 10.2 0.3
proves that the testing tricks, e.g., extra local features en-
semble in AlignedReID [44] and flipped image ensembling
in PCB [36], are unable to resist our attack.
Attacking Augmented ReID Systems. Many state-of-
the-art ReID systems use the trick of data augmentation.
Next, we examine the effectiveness of our model in attack-
ing these augmentation-based systems. Rather than conven-
tional data augmentation trick (e.g., random cropping, flip-
ping, and 2D-translation), we examine four new augmen-
tation tricks using GAN to increase the training data. The
evaluation is conducted on Market1501 and DukeMTMC.
The results in Table 1 (a)(c) show that although GAN data
augmentations improve the ReID accuracy, they cannot de-
fend our attack. In contrast, we have even observed that
better ReID accuracy may lead to worse robustness.
Discussion. We have three remarks for rethinking the
robustness of ReID systems for future improvement. First,
there is no effective way so far to defend against our at-
tacks, e.g., after our attack, all rank-1 accuracies drop
below 3.9%. Second, the robustness of Mudeep [5] and
PCB [36] are strongest. Intuitively, Mudeep may bene-
fit from its nonlinear and large receptive field. For PCB,
reprocessing the query images and hiding the network ar-
chitecture during evaluation may improve the robustness.
Third, HACNN [19] has the lowest rank-1 to rank-20 accu-
racy after the attack, suggesting that attention mechanism
may be harmful to the defensibility. The returns from the
target ReID system before and after the adversarial attack
are provided in Appendix A.
4.2. Ablation Study
We conduct comprehensive studies to validate the effective-
ness of each component of our method. AlignedReID [44]
is used as our target model in the rest of the paper for its
remarkable results in ReID domain.
Different Losses. We report the rank-1 accuracy of four
different losses to validate the effectiveness of our loss. The
results are shown in Table 2 (a), where the four rows rep-
resent (A) the conventional misclassification loss, (B) our
misclassification, (C) our mis-ranking loss, and (D) our
misclassification + our mis-ranking loss, respectively. Ac-
tually, we observe that conventional misclassification loss
A is incompatible with the perception loss, leading to poor
attack performance (28.5%). In contrast, our visual mis-
ranking loss D achieves very appealing attack performance
(1.4%). We also observe that our misclassification loss
B and our visual mis-ranking loss C benefit each other.
Specifically, by combining these two losses, we obtain Loss
D, which outperforms all the other losses.
Multi-stage vs. Common Discriminator. To validate
the effectiveness of our multi-stage discriminator, we com-
pare the following settings: (A) using our multi-stage dis-
criminator and (B) using a commonly used discriminator.
Specifically, we replace our multi-stage discriminator with
PatchGAN [14]. Table 2 (c) shows a significant degrada-
tion of attack performance after changing the discriminator,
demonstrating the superiority of our multi-stage discrimi-
nator to capture more details for a better attack.
Using MS-SSIM. To demonstrate the superiority of MS-
SSIM, we visualize the adversarial examples under differ-
ent perception supervisions in Fig. 4. We can see that at
the same magnitude, the adversarial example generated un-
der the supervision of MS-SSIM are much better than those
generated under the supervision of SSIM and without any
supervision. This comparison verifies that MS-SSIM is crit-
ical to reserve the raw appearance.
Comparisons of Different . Although using perception
loss has great improvement for visual quality with large ,
Table 2. Ablations. We present six major ablation experiments in this table. R-1,R-5,& R-10: Rank-1, Rank-5, & Rank-10.
R-1 R-5 R-10 mAP R-1 R-5 R-10 mAP R-1 R-5 R-10 mAP
(A) cent 28.5 43.9 51.4 23.8 =40 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.2 PatchGAN (=40) 48.3 65.8 73.1 37.7
(B) xent 13.7 22.5 28.7 12.5 =20 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.4 Ours (=40) 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.2
(C) etri 4.5 9.1 12.5 5.1 =16 1.4 3.7 5.4 2.3 PatchGAN (=10) 53.3 69.2 75.6 43.2
(D) xent+etri 1.4 3.7 5.4 2.3 =10 24.4 38.5 46.6 21.0 Ours (=10) 24.4 38.5 46.6 21.0
(a) Different Objectives: The modified xent loss out-
performs the cent loss, but both of them are unstable.
Our loss brings more stable and higher fooling rate
than misclassification.
(b) Comparisons of different : Results on
the variants of our model using different .
Our proposed method achieves good results
even when  = 10.
(c) Multi-stage vs. Common discriminator: Multi-
stage technique improves results under both large
and small  for utilizing the information from
previous layers.
R-1 R-5 R-10 mAP R-1 R-5 R-10 mAP R-1 R-5 R-10 mAP
Market→CUHK 4.9 9.2 12.1 6.0 →PCB 31.7 46.1 53.2 22.9 →PCB(C) 6.9 12.9 18.9 8.2
CUHK→Market 34.3 51.6 58.6 28.2 →HACNN 14.8 24.4 29.8 13.4 →HACNN(C) 3.6 7.1 9.2 4.6
Market→Duke 17.7 26.7 32.6 14.2 →LSRO 17.0 28.9 35.1 14.8 →LSRO(D) 19.4 30.2 34.7 15.2
Market→MSMT 35.1 49.4 55.8 27.0 →Mudeep(C)* 19.4 27.7 34.9 16.2
(d) Crossing Dataset. Market→CUHK: noises
learned from Market1501 mislead inferring on
CUHK03. All experiments are based on Aligned-
ReID model.
(e) Crossing Model.→PCB: noises learned
from AlignedReID attack pretrained PCB
model. All experiments are performed on
Market1501.
(f) Crossing Dataset & Model.→ PCB(C):
noises learned from AlignedReID pretrained on
Market-1501 are borrowed to attack PCB model
inferred on CUHK03. * denotes 4k-pixel attack.
Table 3. Proportion of adversarial points. † denotes the results with
appropriate relaxation.
R-1 R-5 R-10 mAP
Full size 1.4 3.7 5.4 2.3
Ratio=1/2 39.3 55.0 62.4 31.5
Ratio=1/4 72.7 85.9 89.7 58.3
Ratio=1/4† 0.3 1.5 2.7 0.7
Ratio=1/8† 0.6 1.8 3.0 1.1
Ratio=1/16† 8.2 14.7 17.8 6.9
Ratio=1/32† 59.4 76.5 82.2 47.3
Ratio=1/64† 75.5 87.6 91.6 61.5
Table 4. Effectiveness of our multi-shot sampling.
(A) random location (B) our learned location
R-1 mAP R-1 mAP
Gaussian noise 81.9 68.1 79.4 65.3
Uniform noise 51.1 40.1 50.7 39.2
Ours - - 39.7 30.7
we also provide baseline models with smaller  for full stud-
ies. We manually control  by considering it as a hyperpa-
rameter. The comparisons of different  are reported in Ta-
ble 2 (b). Our method has achieved good results, even when
 = 15. The visualization of several adversarial examples
with different  can be seen in Appendix D.
Number of the Pixels to be Attacked. Let H and W
denote the height and the width of the image. We control
the number of the pixels to be attacked in the range of {1,
1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16, 1/32, 1/64} ×HW respectively by us-
ing Eqn. 3. We have two major observations from Table 3.
First, the attack is definitely successful when the number
of the pixels to be attacked > HW2 . This indicates that we
can fully attack the ReID system by using a noise number
of only HW2 . Second, when the number of pixels to be at-
tacked < HW2 , the success attack rate drops significantly.
To compensate for the decrease in noise number, we pro-
pose to enhance the noise magnitude without significantly
affecting the perception. In this way, the least number of
pixels to be attacked is reduced to HW32 , indicating that the
number and the magnitude of the noise are both important.
Effectiveness of Our Multi-shot Sampling. To justify
the effectiveness of our learned noise in attacking ReID, we
compare them with random noise under the restriction of
ε = 40 in two aspects in Table 4. (A) Random noise is im-
posed on random locations of an image. The results suggest
that rand noise is inferior to our learned noise. (B) Random
noise is imposed on our learned location of an image. In-
terestingly, although (B) has worse attack performance than
our learned noise, (B) outperforms (A). This indicates our
method successfully finds the sensitive location to attack.
Interpretability of Our Attack. After the analysis of the
superiority of our learned noise, we further visualize the
noise layout to explore the interpretability of our attack in
ReID. Unfortunately, a single image cannot provide intu-
itive information (see Appendix B). We statistically display
query images and masks when noise number equals to HW8
in Fig. 5 for further analysis. We can observe from Fig. 5
(b) that the network has a tendency to attack the top half of
the average image, which corresponds to the upper body of
a person in Fig. 5(a). This implies that the network is able
to sketch out the dominant region of the image for ReID.
For future improvement of the robustness of ReID systems,
attention should be paid to this dominant region.
4.3. Black-Box Attack
Different from the above white-box attack, a black-box
attack denotes that the attacker has no access to the training
data and target models, which is very challenging.
Cross-dataset attack. Cross-dataset denotes that the at-
tacker is learned on a known dataset, but is reused to at-
tack a model that is trained on an unknown dataset. Table 2
(d) shows the success of our cross-dataset attack in Aligne-
dReID [44]. We also observe that the success rate of the
cross-dataset attack is almost as good as the naive white-
box attack. Moreover, MSMT17 is a dataset that simulates
the real scenarios by covering multi-scene and multi-time.
Therefore, the successful attack on MSMT17 proves that
our method is able to attack ReID systems in the real scene
without knowing the information of real-scene data.
Cross-model attack. Cross-model attack denotes that
(a) Original
(b) Without supervision
(c) SSIM
(d) MS-SSIM
Figure 4. Visual comparison of using different supervisions.
the attacker is learned by attacking a known model, but is
reused to attack an unknown model. Experiments on Mar-
ket1501 show that existing ReID systems are also fooled by
our cross-model attacked (Table 2 (e)). It is worth to men-
tion that PCB seems to be more robust than others, indicat-
ing that hiding the testing protocol benefits the robustness.
Cross-dataset-cross-model attack. We further examine
the most challenging setting, i.e., our attacker has no access
to both the training data and the model. The datasets and
models are randomly chosen in Table 2 (f). Surprisingly,
we have observed that our method has successfully fooled
all the ReID systems, even in such an extreme condition.
Note that Mudeep has been attacked by only 4,000 pixels.
Discussion. We have the following remarks for future
improvement in ReID. First, although the bias of data dis-
tributions in different ReID datasets reduces the accuracy of
a ReID system, it is not the cause of security vulnerability,
as is proved by the success of cross-dataset attack above.
Second, the success of cross-model attack implies that the
flaws of networks should be the cause of security vulnerabil-
ity. Third, the success of a cross-dataset-cross-model attack
drives us to rethink the vulnerability of existing ReID sys-
tems. Even we have no prior knowledge of a target system;
we can use the public available ReID model and datasets
to learn an attacker, using which we can perform the cross-
dataset-cross-model attack in the target systems. Actually,
we have fooled a real-world system (see Appendix D).
4.4. Comparison with Existing Attackers
To show the generalization capability of our method, we
perform an additional experiment on image classification
using CIFAR10. We compare our method with four ad-
(a) Average image (b) Position statistics
Figure 5. Left: The average image of all queries on Market1501.
Right: The frequency of adversarial points appears at different
positions among Market1501 when ratio=1/8. The higher the color
temperature is, the frequently the position tends to be selected.
Table 5. Accuracy after non-targeted white-box attacks on CI-
FAR10. Original: the accuracy on clean images. DeepFool: [29];
NewtonFool: [15]; NewtonFool: [15]; CW: [1]; GAP: [41];
Method Accuracy (%)
Original 90.55
DeepFool
ε = 8
58.22
ε = 2
58.59
NewtonFool 69.79 69.32
CW 52.27 53.44
GAP 51.26 51.8
Ours 47.31 50.3
vanced white-box attack methods in adversarial examples
community, including DeepFool [29], NewtonFool [15],
CW [1], and GAP [41]. We employ adversarially trained
ResNet32 as our target model and fix ε = 8. Other hyper-
parameters are configured using default settings the same
as [30]. For each attack method, we list the accuracy of
the resulting network on the full CIFAR10 val set. The re-
sults in Table 5 imply that our proposed algorithm is also
effective in obfuscating the classification system. Note that
changing ε to other numbers (e.g., ε = 2) does not reduce
the superiority of our method over the competitors.
5. Conclusion
We examine the insecurity of current ReID systems by
proposing a learning-to-mis-rank formulation to perturb the
ranking of the system output. Our mis-ranking based at-
tacker is complementary to the existing misclassification
based attackers. We also develop a multi-stage network ar-
chitecture to extract general and transferable features for the
adversarial perturbations, allowing our attacker to perform a
black-box attack. We focus on the inconspicuousness of our
attacker by controlling the number of attacked pixels and
keeping the visual quality. The experiments not only show
the effectiveness of our method but also provides directions
for the future improvement in the robustness of ReID.
6. Appendix A: More Visualization of the De-
struction to the ReID system
We present more results from both Market1501 and
CUHK03 datasets by exhibiting the Rank-10 matches from
the target ReID system before and after an adversarial attack
in Figure 6.
Query
Query
Query
Query
Before
After
Market1501⬆
CUHK03    ⬇
Figure 6. The rank-10 predictions of AlignedReID [36] (one of
the state-of-the-art ReID models) before and after our attack on
Market-1501 and CUHK03. We display the gallery images ac-
cording to their rank accuracies returned from AlignedReID [44]
model. The green boxes are the correctly matched images, while
the red boxed are the mismatched images. Only top-10 gallery
images are visualized.
7. Appendix B: Visualization of Sampling
Mask
We further visualize the noise layout in Figure 7 to ex-
plore the interpretability of our attack in ReID. However,
it is hard to get intuitive information from a few sporadic
samples.
8. Appendix C: More Details of Attacking
The experiments are performed on a workstation with an
NVIDIA Titan X GPU with 12GB GPU memory. The pro-
tocols of target models are the same as their official releases.
The minibatch size is 32 for 50 epochs. The filters in each
multi-column network in our multi-stage discriminator are
4 × 4. The weights were initialized from a truncated nor-
mal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.02
if the layer is not followed by the spectral normalization.
The whole network is trained in an end-to-end fashion us-
ing Adam [16] optimizer with the default setting, and the
Figure 7. The layout of the noise. Column 1 shows the query im-
ages. Column 2-7 are the noise layouts with different noise num-
bers, i.e., {1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16, 1/32, 1/64} ×HW .
learning rate is set to 2e-4.
As for the balanced factors in our full objective, the se-
lection of β mainly depends on how worse the visual quality
we can endure. In our case, we fix α = 2 and β = 5 in the
main experiments but β ranging from 5 to 0 when we grad-
ually cut down the number of attacked pixels.
9. Appendix D: Attacking to the Real-world
System
To the best of our knowledge, no ReID API is available
online for the public to attack. Fortunately, we find a real-
world system, Human Detection and Attributes API pro-
vided by Baidu (https://ai.baidu.com/tech/body/attr), that
can examine the capacity of our attacker. Actually, our at-
tacker is able to perform an attribute attack, which is crucial
in ReID. We randomly pick up person images with back-
pack from Google and generate noise to them using our
attacker. This results in the adversarial examples listed in
Fig. 8. When uploading these adversarial examples to the
Baidu API, the API misclassified them as persons without
backpack, implying the real-world system has been fooled
by our attacker.
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